The coming week may be the most important yet in Donald Trump’s presidency. It will be the decisive moment for a US military strike on Iran’s deeply buried nuclear facilities.
Or not: Trump may choose to hold fire. On that decision hangs the tenuous future of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Iranians may seize the moment to liberate themselves from a corrupt theocratic regime that has wanted to dominate the Middle East, destroy Israel and fund terrorism globally.
Or not: The regime may hang on by repressing, arresting and killing its opponents. Israel will keep prosecuting the war with great intelligence and military skill, but Iron Dome anti-missile warheads are being depleted. Jerusalem can’t keep this extreme rate of effort going forever.
On Friday AEST Trump said about a possible strike on Iran: “I will make my decision whether or not to go within the next two weeks.” This could mean anything: it may buy time for negotiations with Tehran or more military preparations or be cover for an imminent strike.
Foreign Minister Penny Wong announced that the Australian embassy in Tehran would close, signalling where our government thinks the issue is heading. What’s at stake in the next few days is Trump’s credibility as a commander-in-chief, the survival of the Iranian regime and Israel’s place in the Middle East.
To that let’s add the viability of NATO. On June 24-25, NATO heads of government meet in The Hague. The alliance has two wars to manage, Ukraine and in the Middle East, and precious little agreement on how to deal with either.
In all this seriousness the comedy moment might have been Anthony Albanese arriving at short notice to hassle Trump about tariffs and AUKUS. The Prime Minister had been mulling going to the meeting but now reportedly is expected to send Richard Marles in his stead.
Let’s work through these issues sequentially. Last week Trump’s White House released a media note summarising the dozens of times over many years the President has said Iran cannot be allowed to have a nuclear weapon.
The President has put in place the military capabilities needed for the US to strike the Fordow nuclear reprocessing complex, buried under a mountain and reachable, it is said, only with massive “bunker-busting” weapons.
Trump has called for the Iranian regime’s unconditional surrender. At a minimum this must surely mean that Khamenei would agree to verifiably abandon the nuclear program. The White House reportedly also is doing its best to dampen isolationist elements in the MAGA support base.
Trump has drawn his red line. His credibility rests on carrying through the threat to apply the coup de grace at Fordow. If that hasn’t happened by the time you are reading this article, my judgment is that it will take place around the NATO summit.
The US aircraft carrier Nimitz is in the eastern Indian Ocean steaming towards the Mediterranean; by mid-next week its air wing will be close enough to provide extra protection against Iranian missile strikes directed against Israel and American military forces in the region.
While the B-2 aircraft carrying the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bunker busters most likely will come from the continental US, a cautious President (which Trump is in military affairs) will want broader air coverage in place before striking.
President Donald Trump will make a decision on whether the U.S. will get involved in the Israel-Iran air war in the next two weeks, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on Thursday (June 19), citing a message from Trump.
Trump will remember Barack Obama’s ignominious moment in 2012 where he failed to act against Syria’s Bashar al-Assad using chemical weapons against the latter’s own people. Presidents risk their credibility if they do not defend their own red lines.
It is to Trump’s credit that he tries to avoid conflict and for that reason I think he will restrict US airstrikes to a limited number of nuclear targets. All bets are off though if the Iranians start to attack US forces in the Middle East. Then the US will target a wide range of Iranian military facilities, which is why the Nimitz carrier strike group needs to be in place.
If these developments play out, Trump could arrive at NATO to everybody’s surprise, and perhaps his own, having established a doctrine for using military power.
It isn’t written down anywhere yet but the Trump Doctrine looks like this: Allies must lead on military operations; the President is the sole decision-maker of US military use, even cabinet ministers have little sway; Trump will keep options open not to use force up to the last minute; social media is the diplomatic communication method; the US uses air power and missiles almost exclusively. This reverses a more traditional US approach where allies provide niche components for a coalition force and Washington drives the broad strategic objectives.
The Trump Doctrine reinforces the priority that America’s partners must look to their own security interests first. Being strong and capable defenders of your own interests is what will trigger US support. This reinforces every message Trump has delivered NATO. He favours countries that invest in their own security; in US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth’s words at the Shangri La Dialogue, the “model allies like Poland, Israel, and the Gulf states, the Baltic states”.
Turning to the second big issue for the coming weeks: are we about to see a regime change in Iran? To use a Trump phrase: “Well maybe, maybe not.”
It’s certain that the Iranian regime is repressive and brutal and widely despised by many younger Iranians, particularly in the cities.
Since the Israeli strikes began there have been small protests against the regime. Students have been arrested chanting anti-regime slogans. Outside of Tehran heavy-machinery operators have protested about fuel cuts and in Shiraz farmers protested over water mismanagement.
In the capital, rolling electricity cuts, food prices and shortages and the unavailability of medicines have been serious problems for months. The regime is hitting back hard, including by blocking internet and information access, but at least half of Tehranis clandestinely watch international news with satellite dishes or via virtual private networks.
A measure of access to foreign media is that around 100,000 people reportedly chose to leave Tehran when Trump told them to last week, but that is only a fraction in a city of about 10 million people.
The Israelis have had remarkable success in killing senior military and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps leaders. It has been less widely reported that Israel also has targeted internal security agencies. The Israeli Air Force has struck the Law Enforcement Command headquarters in Tehran, one of the regime’s most repressive forces along with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Shahid Meisami Group, which provides tear gas and other incapacitating agents to security forces.
Ending Iran’s nuclear program goes only part way to delivering Israel and the wider Middle East security. Ultimately what must be ended is the regime that drove that program – and the network of terrorist proxies – in the first place.
I think it’s reasonable to conclude that Israel is hoping its strikes, which have been carefully directed to minimise civilian casualties, will spark a popular uprising that wipes out the Khamenei regime. Trump’s public pressure on Khamenei, the call for total surrender and for Tehranis to leave the city, pushes towards regime change without committing the US to deliver that outcome. The next few weeks will be decisive in seeing if a tipping point can be reached that allows Iranians to change their own regime.
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Picture: Getty Images
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Picture: Getty Images
Who knows what kind of government will emerge and whether that improves the lot of Iranians and regional security. It seems, though, that the regime is in its final days. If it hangs on, it won’t be in a position for years to support proxy terror groups and pursue nuclear weapons. Moreover, Iran will not be exporting drones to Russia to use in Ukraine. Russia and China will see their interests damaged if the regime falls. That’s reason enough to hope a regime change may be positive.
Third is Israel’s position. Starting with strikes on June 12 Israel has achieved an astonishing degree of battlefield dominance. It has managed wave after wave of co-ordinated strikes, killing senior leaders, destroying nuclear facilities, knocking out missile launchers and destroying many enabling capabilities. This involved intelligence and sabotage operations inside Iran of which Tehran had no knowledge, including smuggling in drone parts, assembling and operating them close to targets.
Following Israel’s destruction of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran’s proxy and direct presence in Syria, the current strikes establish Jerusalem as the region’s dominant strategic power. My view is this will lead to a renewal of the Abraham Accords, with Saudi Arabia a renewed prospect to join. What emerges is an close alignment of Saudi, Israeli and US security interests.
But let’s not celebrate too quickly. Security is fluid in the Middle East; dominance is contested and never permanent. It’s also far too soon to write off Iran’s capacity to damage Israel.
Military analysts will study Israel’s campaign for years to come. The offensive use of drones at distance (like Ukraine’s recent operation in Russia); offensive cyber operations; integrating intelligence and sabotage operations with an air campaign – these will rewrite military textbooks.
A forward-thinking Australian Defence Force should ask: what if our potential enemies operated like Israel? And what if we did?
A forward-thinking Australian Defence Force should ask: what if our potential enemies operated like Israel? And what if we did? Are these questions being asked anywhere in our Defence system? If so, they are being held in a bunker deeper than the Fordow uranium centrifuges.
And what of our Prime Minister and the US President? Having done his best to avoid meeting Trump since last November and being publicly and comprehensively snubbed at the Canadian G7 meeting, Albanese floated a cunning plan to meet Trump at NATO. This was not a good idea.
Trump will arrive having authorised a major military operation or, less likely, having backed down from one. Trump notoriously hates multilateral meetings; he gets tired from international meetings and dislikes preparing for them. In his worse moods he regards the Europeans as ripping off the US and NATO as failing to pay its share for security. So, this was where Albanese wanted to complain about tariffs and claim our genius handling of our defence budget was so superior we should not have to increase spending?
It’s clear why Albanese won’t go to the Oval Office: he wants to avoid a Zelensky-style browbeating. The President will read this as a sign of weakness. Trump has no patience for weakness.
Hanging around the margins of summits where we are not even a member will not persuade Trump that Australia is serious about our alliance responsibilities. Having floated the idea, if Albanese now abandons plans to go to NATO that will look like he is choosing to avoid meeting Trump. Not such a cunning plan after all.
Nor will Trump be impressed by Marles’s comments at the Defending Australia summit last Monday that “our continent is more relevant to great power contest now than it’s ever been before. That is as much of a question in the here and now as is the building up of our defence capability.”
Marles is saying his government is incapable of strengthening the Australian Defence Force in the “here and now” of this decade and access to the continent by the US “is as much of a question” as anything he can do as Defence Minister. This is the most public expression of a point I understand Marles privately makes.
Let’s relate this back to the emerging Trump Doctrine and the idea that the President is most interested in helping allies that help themselves. Australia is failing badly in its alliance relationship on three counts.
First, Albanese seems more interested in avoiding Trump than engaging with him. I can’t think of a less successful relationship between a prime minister and a president since Gough Whitlam and Richard Nixon.
Second, we are comprehensively failing a test of defence spending adequacy. The Americans have said so publicly. I don’t think Hegseth really wants a precise GDP figure as a benchmark, but we clearly are not in the ballpark.
Third, our policy towards Israel is damaging our position in Washington and comprehensively misreading the direction of strategic trends in the Middle East.
Our failure to manage our alliance with the US – the most important pillar supporting our place in the world – is so bad it is turning into pure farce.
With major strategic changes in the offing, we need to drastically improve our performance.
This article was first published in The Australian.