In January 2026, and again in March, the world changed dramatically and fundamentally. Since then, changes have since been occurring on an almost daily basis. Actions taken by the United States administration under President Trump have highlighted the flaws in the slavish reliance on the ‘global rules-based order’ as a pillar of national security. Writing for the Lowy Institute, Sophie Wushuang Yi observed that ‘Trump has swapped “productive hypocrisy” for crude exercises of power’.
The fundamental nature of this change was reinforced by the Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his much-reported 2026 Davos speech when he highlighted the rupture in the so-called “international rules-based order”, and categorically stated that ‘you cannot live within the lie of mutual benefit through integration, when integration becomes the source of your subordination’. At this point Carney was discussing economic integration, but the same argument can be applied to military elements of national security.
Australia’s National Defence Strategy 2024 placed significant importance on ‘upholding the global rules-based order’ and noted that ‘the US remains fundamental to Australia’s national security’. The National Defence Strategy 2026 merely meekly noted that ‘the global rules-based order which has underpinned Australia’s security and prosperity for decades, is in transition’ but did not raise any need for change. The problem is that both of these key elements for Australia’s defence strategy are from yesterday. President Trump and Prime Minister Carney, in their respective ways, have shown that tomorrow’s strategy needs to be something different. The rules-based order is somewhat illusionary, and the US is, whilst not necessarily unreliable and untrustworthy, certainly less reliable and less trustworthy. And there is no going back.
We are at a critical juncture in world events, and in the way that nations relate to each other. As demonstrated by the 2026 US National Defense Strategy, and by events in Ukraine and the Middle East, a more brutal world is emerging. A world where national interests (and sometimes it seem even private interests of major decision makers) are more narrowly defined and where power is exercised by those who have it in pursuit, or protection, of those interests. The key players will address security on a more direct, transactional basis. The “enlightened self-interest” approach previously adopted by the United States is disappearing. Enlightenment is for yesterday, self-interest is ascendent.
Australia therefore needs a new strategy. One that reflects the world as it is and where we want to be in it, not the historical one that we would like to retain. This new strategy must also reflect the reality of a legacy force structure, developed for this bygone world. Australia’s revised national strategy needs to be based on one overriding principle, addressed both internally and externally.
The focus needs to be on national resilience; a concept related to but separate from the bandied-about concepts of self-reliance and sovereignty. They all distil down into the ability to act independently when required. To address our own interests in the manner and in the form that is appropriate to Australia. This is not self-sufficiency, so it requires prioritisation.
In Australia, prioritisation is hard. Every child needs to win a prize. But there can be no deterrence, and no denial, without resilience. And this is not just resilience in a military sense. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has clearly demonstrated the national imported fuel vulnerability, and how this vulnerability quickly permeates throughout the entire society and economy.
To make resilience real, rather than just a slogan, a concerted effort is required to map Australian society and the economy. To determine where the pain points are. Where the infrastructure is inadequate. Where the most significant vulnerabilities and the real risks are. And, therefore, where we really need to invest for a reinvigorated manufacturing base, a manufacturing base that provides outcomes linked to strategic goals, rather than just for what is politically attractive or where the vested interest voices are the loudest. This will require a national framework, and the removal of the current siloed approach that inhibits meaningful progress.
The National Defence Strategy (NDS) addresses denial and deterrence through a military power lens. The underlying thesis is that the force structure and associated supply chains will deter. This might be true for a superpower, but that is not Australia.
The NDS fails to recognise that the national defence effort consumes the output from other parts of the economy. Defence is therefore reliant upon that broader economy. It is self-defeating to pretend otherwise. A strategy based on deterrence for a country like Australia can only work if the would-be-deterred party sees that the holistic society is resilient. That all the requisite parts – energy, transport, water, food, telecommunications, infrastructure – work in a way that not only sustains and supports society and the economy, but the defence effort as well. A first step must be the appointment of a national resilience authority with real power to direct responses across all parts of the government and the Australian economy.
Australia’s strategic culture has been characterised as a combination of anxiety and dependence. Since the earliest days of European settlement, and reinforced by events during both World Wars, Australia has a long-standing insecurity about its place in the region and in the world. Anxiety has seen Australia seek security in the embrace of “great and powerful friends”. Over time, this embrace has resulted in dependence which has raised fears of abandonment and increased anxiety. We have attempted to assuage this self-doubt by convincing ourselves that we have a “special relationship” with our protector, and that our security is just as important to them as it is to us.
Australia is now caught in a self-reinforcing loop. Anxiety brings distrust regarding the motives of other actors; particularly more powerful actors. Distrust raises the perception of threat. Threats, or at least the feeling of being threatened, are militarily addressed through interoperability and “guaranteed” supply chains. The result is dependence. In turn dependence restricts the depth and breadth of alternative international relations. Anxiety increases. The cycle continues. Carney’s assessment regarding subordination is vindicated.
The 2026 National Defence Strategy continues and amplifies this trend. It states that the alliance with the United States ‘expands our strategic options, making us less vulnerable to coercion and enabling Australia to pursue capabilities and interests far beyond what we could achieve alone’. Whilst there can be no denying the importance of this relationship, we currently have all our eggs in one, increasingly unreliable and unpredictable, basket. The argument in the NDS is flawed. It presents Australia’s strategic choices in a binary manner – either with the US or not. It does not open the consideration of alternatives.
The US relationship needs to be nuanced – away from the reliant position that we currently have and towards greater self-direction, greater resilience. In both thought and action. The situation in the US is not going to just snap back into place once Donald Trump departs the scene. We are in a new world. We need to act accordingly. While we can’t just walk away, we need to make sure that alternative paths remain open and clear. Increased military integration with the US works against us here. The NDS does not expand our strategic options, it constrains them.
The challenges to developing resilience are significant. In the military sphere we have an almost complete reliance on the United States, of itself an increasingly fraught position given the recent activities and pronouncements of that ally. Given that resilience supports deterrence we need to deliberately invest where the dollars will make a strategic difference. The constraints of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules that trade independence and resilience off for “value for money” need to be changed to support prioritised Australian manufacturing. Research and development efforts need similar changed and prioritisation. A blind faith in “the market” will not provide the outcomes required.
The manufacturing base needs to be rebuilt. But not just any manufacturing. Workforce size and consumer size are constraints. The rebuilding of manufacturing therefore needs to be aligned to resilience. For the mitigation of strategic risks. The economic benefits and the employment benefits will then follow.
The actions of the current government are increasing our dependence on an unreliable partner in an increasingly uncertain world. They are reducing the ability for Australia to make alternative decisions and to chart the alternative course that the nation needs.
It will not be cheap to take a more independent, self-reliant and resilient approach. There are risks involved. But there are arguably more risks in continuing on our current path of dependence. A new strategy is required. And as the saying goes, “if not now, then when?”.