Former Chief of the Australian Defence Force Mark Binskin’s report into the tragic killing in Gaza on 1 April of Zomi Frankcom and six other aid workers from the World Central Kitchen informs us that he received close Israeli military and government cooperation in conducting his work. The Israelis certainly had no requirement to assist Binskin. To interfere in a foreign country’s domestic military review and discipline was a diplomatic insult to Israel, implying that Israel couldn’t conduct its own investigation without supervision.
Binskin’s conclusions undercut narratives about wanton Israeli breaches of international humanitarian law and laws of armed conflict. He says that Israel’s acceptance of accountability for the WCK incident, and its investigation, reporting and responding has, to this point, been “timely, appropriate and, with some exceptions, sufficient.” The exceptions he mentions are that the IDF public statement released on 5 April lacked specific detail included in the closed debrief “that could have helped reduce confusion and speculation.”
Accusations that the deaths occurred because of deliberate targeting of aid workers or flawed targeting policies find no support from Binskin. Instead, he found that “the IDF’s view of the material issues in respect of targeting law relevant to this incident – particularly precautions in attack, including identification criteria and classification of people in terms of liability to lethal targeting – are the same as the Australian Defence Force would likewise be concerned with in such a situation”. He points out that the IDF’s view of the role of rules of engagement and standard operating procedures in respect of where delegations to engage are held, “also appears similar to that of the ADF.”
Rather than this being a war crime, as was implied in the Australian debate at the time of the deaths, Binskin observes that the WCK incident “is not dissimilar to situations that other Western militaries have faced, such as in relation to the Kunduz hospital attack in Afghanistan, which killed many civilians and destroyed a hospital, but where the underlying conduct – while culpable – was not assessed as meeting the requirements for a charge of unlawful killing.”
It defies belief that Penny Wong failed to note in her Friday press conference on Binskin’s report that he found that that the IDF was under a reasonable and justified opinion that the convoy was under either Hamas control or someone with links to Hamas and that they were armed in contravention of WCK protocols. If the IDF failed, WCK also contributed in a variety of ways not discussed by the Foreign Minister. WCK didn’t adhere to their own communication protocols.
Why didn’t the foreign minister mention any of this in her Friday press conference on the report? When the Albanese government two years ago reversed Scott Morrison decision made in late 2018 to recognise West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital Penny Wong accused him of being irresponsible and using foreign policy for a cynical play to win the seat of Wentworth in a by-election. In not discussing the full findings of Binskin’s review Wong risks being accused of playing to internal Labor politics on Israel and political threats to the Labor party from the Greens.
In some ways the most striking findings of Binskin’s report tell us about Australian failings, not Israeli ones. The IDF took action to investigate the incident in the 72 hours following it. The officer who guided the strike was dismissed, as was the Brigade Chief of Staff above him. Three more senior officers further up the IDF’s command chain have been formally reprimanded. Binskin notes that’s likely to affect future career and future service. He points out that possible legal action against some of these personnel is likely to be decided upon in the next few months, with prosecutions possible in the next 12 months. That’s all unlike the Australian approach to investigation and prosecution of Afghan war crimes allegations from 2012 against our own military.
In what can best be characterised as a massive understatement, Binkskin says that the “command power in Australia can also support quick decisions regarding removal from post in operational situations (but) the ADF could not have imposed equivalent reprimands as quickly as the IDF.”
Instead of Israel’s rapid, decisive action, we’ve waited here 12 years from the conduct and allegations with no single commander dismissed or prosecuted. Indeed, the senior officers in charge have been awarded high military honours. One person is being prosecuted and more might be at some future point, but they’re foot soldiers, not officers who held command responsibility.
In many ways Binskin’s appointment was a diplomatic insult, implying Israel was incapable of conducting its own professional investigation without outside supervision.
No reports or prosecutions can bring Zomi Frankcom back to her family.
But Binskin’s report can serve a purpose larger than this specific tragedy.
It can shine a spotlight on institutional weaknesses within our own government and military, reigniting work to finally hold Australian commanders to account for their failings in Afghanistan. Just as importantly it can provide a foundation for informed discussion of the conflict in Gaza and the Israeli military’s actions. It should quieten the echo chamber that condemns the IDF without knowledge or insight into how it operates.
A version of this article was first published in The Australian on 6 August 2024.