In a recent article published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Edward Chan points out that Australian governments have been hesitant to engage too closely with China on maritime security issues. He argues that must change: Australia should be looking for opportunities to collaborate with China on ocean governance and on non-traditional security issues like environmental sustainability, transnational crime, sea lane safety, and climate change. This is the core of a maritime governance innovation idea developed while he participated in the Indo-Pacific Maritime Governance Expanded Network for Innovation and Education (GENIE) organised by La Trobe Asia and the Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS).
Chan notes that many countries in the region “remain open to working with China on shared maritime challenges” such as climate change and illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU). He argues that by being proactive in dialogue with China, the largest state in the region, and promoting adherence to international laws, Australia will enhance its role as a regional maritime state. The author argues that ocean governance is “far too important to be sidelined by geopolitical rivalries”— though he seems not to notice that China’s actions in its geopolitical rivalries and its aggressive push into South East Asia involve comprehensive breaking of maritime laws that makes cooperation almost meaningless.
This line of assertion about engagement reduced to its basic foundations suggests that any kind of “dialogue is good”—if only we can quarantine areas of major disagreement, we can find narrow (though shrinking) areas for productive cooperation. But how can a state like Australia, one that agrees with and helped shape UNCLOS in international negotiations and that abides by key maritime laws, have productive engagement with China? The PRC is a power that’s actively and comprehensively breaking the ocean laws it’s signed up to. It is busy “monstering” other nations to take their maritime territories and land features in their offshore zones.
China has ignored international legal outcomes on law of the sea rulings. When it comes to the Philippines maritime rights China is not “colliding” (Chan’s wording) with Filipino boats—it is ramming them. It destroys the maritime environment by building artificial islands in the exclusive economic zones of other countries.
If Australia were to adopt Chan’s recommendations, it would give a false legitimacy to China’s hollow commitments to international law. Thus, we would enable and encourage continued Chinese state behaviour that is deeply against our interests. Chan, for example, talks of countering IUU fishing as an area of cooperation with China. Really? Chinese fishing fleets are brazenly exploiting other states’ fisheries. China does little to police its own boats involved in IUU fishing. It deploys its maritime militias, its heavily armed coastguard, and the PLA navy in ways that are against Australia’s and other regional states’ interests.
On climate change, China urges for us to cooperate as a diversion from Chinese strategic objectives and while they open new coal-fired power stations. On transnational crime, the PRC is behind most of it in Asia and the Pacific Islands region. Based on China’s record of conduct, we should have no expectation they will be anything but the most ruthless exploiters of undersea natural resources, so cooperating with them on ocean floor mining or other “blue economy” areas would be similarly misguided. China needs to establish some minimum credibility as a nation interested in meeting its obligations under international maritime related laws for any dialogues and cooperation to be anything but a mistake.
Chan’s argument really amounts to asserting that “we must engage with China”. It’s basically the only message in Chan’s piece. But there’s no evidence advanced by the author that such engagement has produced results for Australia. And no, China slowing down a bit on its “wolf warrior diplomacy” language isn’t progress that matters. The author’s “must engage” line doesn’t recognise that China cuts off communications now and then to make Australia, the US and others think we’re doing something wrong. The Chinese know that many states feel they simply must talk and will offer concessions for the privilege.
When it comes to “ocean governance”, it is quite apparent that most of the problems in this area have to do with the PRC’s behaviour. Thirty years of empirical evidence suggests they know exactly what they’re doing. And everyone in the region knows it. Australia would put its reputation with friends and allies at serious risk if won’t defend them against the aggression they are experiencing from what General Romeo Brawner from the Philippines calls ICAD: illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive Chinese activity.
The author falls into the basic trap of those people who repeatedly utter the mantra: “if only the PRC knew the rules…they’d follow them.” A few years ago, a Chinese state media editor said: “Australia is always there, making trouble. It is a bit like chewing gum stuck on the sole of China’s shoes. Sometimes you have to find a stone to rub it off.” That comment, among others over the years, should tell Australia everything it needs to know about what the CCP thinks of the nation. The more recent evidence for such contempt is the Chinese navy’s February circumnavigation of Australia, including live navy drills off the Tasman Sea, without so much as a courtesy call.
The bottom line is that the Chinese couldn’t care less about our views. What is happening is that China is saying: “sure we’ll cooperate with you where you agree with us. As for the rest… don’t bother us”!
As far as China is concerned, our role in engaging with them on maritime governance is to listen, not speak.
Dr Anthony Bergin is a senior fellow Strategic Analysis Australia