Sovereignty was once, fleetingly, the poster child of Australian defence policy and pronouncements. While it continues to be mentioned, it’s now in such a vague and superficial way that it has been emptied of meaning. This is a mistake. Sovereignty will be, needs to be, a fundamental consideration as we move into an increasingly uncertain world.

In a recent ASPI article,  Sovereignty: more than a slogan, less than absolute , John Coyne makes an attempt to remind readers of its importance. He makes some interesting observations about what it means, and how it has been used. This article will attempt to fill some gaps raised by that article.

The initial point to consider is that sovereignty has many forms. This makes definitions difficult as sovereignty itself is difficult to pin down. These differences have never been properly discussed in the public discourse. It has simply been ‘one size fits all’. Coyne makes the point that ‘the sovereignty debate has also been hijacked by populist commentators and fringe political actors who reduce it to a blunt ideological tool.’ We therefore need clarity around what we mean when we use the term, and the context within which we use it.

State sovereignty is the starting point – and seemingly the end point for most commentators. A nation, as a ‘sovereign state’, has value that others might covet. Ukraine, as an example, bears witness to this. State sovereignty therefore needs to be protected if it is to be retained. Protection typically comes from a military force, but we can also trade away elements of our sovereignty through alliances and other agreements in exchange for perceived, and hoped-for, benefits. The ANZUS alliance is an example.

Then there are forms of sovereignty associated with the utilisation of the military that we create.

Operational sovereignty is the ability of that military to operate when, where, and for the period required. Industrial sovereignty is the ability of the national industrial base to independently provide the goods and services that enable operational sovereignty.

Therefore, the ongoing argument around whether we will have sovereignty over, and the ability to independently decide on, the deployment of nuclear submarines is somewhat pointless if we do not have the industrial capability to allow that deployment to happen in the form, and to the extent, that we want it to happen. The Australian Defence Force, no matter what some commentators would like to think, simply cannot operate in the absence of industrial support.

And in an increasingly complex world, with a seemingly increasingly unreliable and capricious major ally, that means the defence force will require a capable domestic industry over which the government can exercise control if it needs to.

It is a somewhat trite observation that sovereignty costs. Investments are required in priority capabilities, and in the industrial capability and capacity that underpin them. But what we have done when we consider industry support for defence in this country is to look for the economic outcomes – typically jobs – and overlook the strategic outcomes. The ones that will count if we are involved in major conflict.

The industrial sovereignty that we develop therefore needs to be based on an assessment of strategic risk, on where we can get the most from the investment that we decide to make. And, therefore, on the level of risk that we are willing to accept.

Industrial sovereignty, barely if ever mentioned, is the foundation upon which the edifice of deterrence and resilience rests.

Which brings us to Coyne’s other key point. Sovereignty is not binary. It’s not a case of having industrial sovereignty (or any other sort of sovereignty) or not.

It is important to note that there are multiple forms of sovereignty – all of which relate to the degree to which we can independently address the industrial activities necessary to bring the relevant platforms and systems into being, to upgrade them, and to sustain them. That is, we need the ability to control the way we address the outcomes that we seek. Without this we are hostage to the decisions taken somewhere else, and the whims of those decision-makers.  

At the bottom end of this scale is having no industrial sovereignty. The IP and the industrial activities are offshore. Software dependency also fits into this category as ongoing connectivity must be maintained with the offshore provider for software upgrades and patches, but that offshore provider can also, remotely, digitally disable systems. There is no control.  

Then there is what I have previously described as rudimentary industrial sovereignty – simply the ability to independently undertake maintenance activities for a system that we have acquired from an offshore supplier. No independence for upgrade, for improvement. This has typically been the default position for the Australian Department of Defence.

Then there are limited and focused forms that depend upon the extent to which we have access to relevant intellectual property, as well as having the requisite capability and capacity in the domestic industry and in the decision-making authorities.    

Australia has operated most of its military under a significantly reduced form of industrial and operational sovereignty. We have had, and continue to have, limited ability to influence our own destiny. This faith in the willingness and the ability of foreign suppliers to provide necessary support when required is no longer appropriate as the geostrategic environment deteriorates, as major conflict becomes more likely, and as resupply risks increase.

We ignore or minimise the consideration of operational and industrial sovereignty at our peril.

Graeme Dunk is the Head of Strategy at Shoal Group. He has a PhD in defence operational and industrial sovereignty.