Terrorism threat system must be improved

Written by

Anthony Bergin
August 26, 2024

Australia is facing a rising terror threat. This requires our terrorism alert system to be as effective as possible.This month the terrorism threat level was raised from “possible” to “probable”, in our five-level scale of not expected, possible, probable, expected, and certain.  

Our alert system isn’t a perfect science. A “not expected” alert isn’t a guarantee that a terrorist attack won’t happen, just as an “expected” alert is no guarantee that an attack will occur. Absolute security from terrorism through any national public warning system will remain a pipedream. And regardless of the specifics of any system, the intelligence driving it will always contain uncertainties and imprecision. 

But despite these limitations, such a system can psychologically prepare the public by giving people an assessment of the threat at a particular time. It can increase the number of eyes and ears helping our security and law enforcement agencies. It can also remind people to be vigilant and report suspicious activity.

While it can never be perfect, Australia’s national threat alert system can be improved, and these four modest steps are a start.

First, while continuing to maintain a national approach — most state police websites refer the public back to the Australian government’s national security website for the alert level — if there’s a specific and credible threat, then an alert could be issued for that specified geographic region, perhaps a State or Territory or major city. Right now, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides public information on risks in different countries where Australians might travel, and the public is familiar with that system. This first step extends that logic to inside Australia.

Our security agencies and police, however, would naturally need to be mindful that an alert for a specific area may incline a terror cell to relocate to an area where the counter-terrorism focus might be lower, but a more specific warning.

Second, we should consider changes to the duration of alerts. Authorities lowered the alert level to “possible” in November 2022. But unlike weather alerts, terror alerts aren’t backed by scientific data indicating that a threat has reached its peak and declined. Lowering an alert may run the risk of lulling the public into a false sense of security.

A sunset clause – providing the mandatory expiration of a raised level after six months – would allow the level to be lowered objectively. It would provide enough time for intelligence and law enforcement agencies to assess the situation. This would reduce the risk that an elevated level just becomes the “new normal”. The mandatory lowering of an alert after a certain period, unless there’s evidence that it shouldn’t be changed, would reduce the costs associated with remaining at elevated alert levels, such as the costs to critical infrastructure operators and police and would ensure the public was informed of the threat based on the best available, most current intelligence and assessment.

Third, there’s a need to give the public some narrative around each alert level. The description on the website for our current national terrorism threat level states that “probable” means there’s a greater than fifty per cent chance of an onshore attack or attack planning in the next twelve months. But when you visit the national terrorism advisory system website, there’s no narrative provided at all on what each alert level means.  Without explanation, the threat levels are likely to leave Australians alarmed but uninformed.

Finally, and just as importantly, the advisory system website provides no guidance to citizens about what to do at each level. Admittedly it’s no easy task for our political leaders and security agencies to find language that conveys the need to be alert while also avoiding ambiguity and creating a sense of calm.

But one way to test the language here would be to look at warnings used by our meteorological advisory and even bushfire advisory systems. Obviously, distinctions must be made between terrorism alerts and weather alerts. Terrorism warnings aren’t nearly as scientific and rely on classified information, which must be protected, and it’s much more certain when a weather threat is looming and when it’s passed. But the public is used to acting upon natural hazard warnings, and firefighting services and the Bureau of Meteorology have gradually improved their warning systems, with a focus on what people in affected areas can do.

Surely, we can do better than the Prime Minister and ASIO chief telling us that we should be “aware, but not afraid”. The government should be starting to think through what being secure from or during a terror attack might look like in terms of practical advice. We have bushfire plans the content of which will vary depending on location. Perhaps the government should be developing a terrorism personal and community safety plan. 

Singapore does much better than Australia in this area, with a clear government focus on having an informed public and giving them specific steps they can take.

Modest changes to our alert system could better inform the public of the terror threat. Our government and its security agencies can and should do more to give more specific information, demonstrate that the threat level is based on the best, most current intelligence available, and provide advice about practical actions by individuals and communities. Other nations can do this, and Australians expect our authorities to be able to do so too.

Anthony Bergin is a senior fellow at Strategic Analysis Australia. He previously taught homeland security at the Australian Defence Force Academy.

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