Warfare has changed fundamentally. Rather than seeing it as a linear progression—or adapted regression, depending on your perspective—we should understand it as increasing entanglement between the three strategic domains of conventional warfare, nuclear warfare, and cyber warfare.   As such, it is now continuous, with flexes, flows and intersection points between domains.  And that has direct implications for how nations, societies and economies support and manage the needs of shifting geopolitical competition and warfare.

The changing nature of warfare

The pace of change to warfare is quickening.  The massed conventional and nuclear force postures of the West were first downgraded through the peace dividend that resulted from the end of the Cold War. True, the 1990 First Gulf War ensured a long, slow unwinding of the value of conventional capability, with that war demonstrating how massed armour, air superiority and precision weapons ensured a quick defeat of similarly conventionally but much weaker Iraqi forces.  But September 11 drove a shift to counter-insurgency warfare and counterterrorism, particularly on the home front.

Then came the unanticipated return of conventional warfare to Europe, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine.  That has devolved into World War I-style grinding trench warfare, with hard-fought incremental gains—but reinforced by new technologies that have rendered the battlefield more transparent. Drones, both on land and at sea, emerged as viable and important battlefield assets. On land, they reinforced the role of artillery, missiles, and electronic warfare in punishing movement on the battlefield; at sea, they enabled Ukraine to clear the Black Sea of the Russian navy.

But changes have also been felt in the more esoteric world of nuclear deterrence, where Putin’s re-writing of the conditions which might lead to Russian nuclear use seem increasingly shaped by developments, real and prospective, on the Ukrainian battlefield. The world of nuclear coercion has shifted from what it was in the days of the Cold War and changing doctrine and thinking is unlikely to be confined to NATO-Russian relations and the war in Ukraine.

Cyber, though increasingly used as a means of disruption, collection, disinformation and uncertainty, thus far has failed to make its presence felt on the battlefield, reinforcing its status as a separate strategic domain. Instead, classic electronic warfare (EW) and signals intelligence have been of more import, and their use continues to evolve. 

Indeed, we are seeing the interaction between three drivers, all of which are in flux: conventional weapons on the battlefield; Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons, meant to slow Western engagement and add caution to decision-making; and intensifying online activity, including through disinformation campaigns, effective particularly in the global south, undermining Western influence.

Now the dynamic has shifted again—in Lebanon. The attack on Hezbollah first through exploding pagers, then walkie-talkies and solar panels, has broader implications. It raises doubts about the security and integrity of every device, including the most mundane and analogue, even those constructed elsewhere. Moreover, it is an attack which targets the adversary’s self-defined elite—those entitled to special communications tools.

Three or four grams of explosive can prove fatal and is hard to detect. But planted explosives are not necessarily needed, particularly if the goal is not to kill but instead to erode effectiveness or otherwise degrade communications, organisational coherence and trust. The batteries powering many modern devices are prone to fires; overpowering of batteries can be achieved by manipulating manufacturer-sourced software. 

The problems of being a technology taker

The problems of the supply chain, particularly for technology takers such as Australia, are now more heavily freighted with risk. Much of Australia’s industrial and critical equipment and infrastructure is built and sourced elsewhere. Most of that equipment beacons back data, specs and activity to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs), largely for the purpose of monitoring performance software updates and data harvesting for analysis and even sale to third parties. Most such activity is benign, sourced in advanced manufacturing centres in the Netherlands, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, for example.

But many manufacturers have outsourced. The pagers, for example, seem to have been fabricated in Hungary. Many cars may be designed in the United States, Germany, and Sweden, for example, but built in China. Indeed, an increasingly wide range of consumer products, infrastructure and componentry, and the software that operate them, are being designed and built in China: renewable energy systems, EVs, computers and smart phones are examples, as are the large cranes operated at many nations’ ports. But Chinese companies are also still dependent on Western company inputs in many bits of their own design, production and supply chains, plus key commodities, so the vulnerabilities still cut both ways, if unevenly.

The point here is not simply that Western nations need to take more care with supply chains. More attention also needs to be paid to the changing nature of warfare, of international contestation, and the speed and non-linearity of that change. The task for strategists and planners is to ensure that the means they have at their disposal—the industrial base, the skills and capabilities of people, the systems of discovery, adaptation and decision, and the government leaders and officials with the necessary mindsets and underlying knowledge—are up to the task of a more dynamic, unpredictable and changeable world.

Moreover, the political leadership of Western nations need to be able to articulate to their publics the changes in the entangled geostrategic and technological environment, and why and how institutions and systems need to change. It is most often in the how where politicians come undone, because diagnosing a problem is usually harder than providing an effective prescription to cure it.

This is no longer a world in which it makes sense for the Advanced Strategic Capabilities Agency (ASCA) to hold a months-long careful selection of a drone company for provision of a handful of drones into the existing ADF force structure. Nor is it one where separate government departments can act in siloes without the appreciation of the geostrategic environment and broader strategic needs. The new environment comprises pacing challenges for which current structures, embedded in 1990s conceptions and institutions, are ill-suited. 

It would be tempting in our current environment to overly securitise procurement, infrastructure, economic development and innovation. Proposals by departments to place regulatory controls or complex risk assessments on every internet-connected device, for example, would both impart unsustainable overhead and crush innovation. 

Reframing the challenge

Rather, there is value in reframing the challenge. For all that some may wish that we in the West could simply ‘get on’ with China, Russia, North Korea and Iran, the evidence is that our adversaries have little interest in such an outcome. That’s most visible in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in China’s cyber activity, nuclear build-up and aggression in the South China Sea, in North Korea’s sabre-rattling and threats, and in Iran’s use of proxies and provocations in the Middle East and the support each of them is providing to the others in their various ‘struggles’ with the West.  At best, we could ‘get on’ only on their terms, and those terms would be destructive to democracy, our human rights, prosperity and freedoms.

A better framing is one of competition. In a framework of competition, surprise is expected. It is a competition that is likely to be decadal. It’s best characterised as a marathon—effectively an infinite game, but one comprised of a parallel series of sprints—finite games. Economically, it will require substantial reforms, freeing the regulatory constraints that impede entrepreneurial activity and regularising the tax code to minimise overhead and improve collaboration with allies.  We are already in a struggle or competition with the loose confederation of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. Admitting this will only make our competitors’ advantage in this struggle smaller, by letting our companies, universities and populations into an open secret within government.

With the shift in warfare and the prospect of ongoing surprise, we need real urgency for AUKUS Pillar 2 to deliver—and with it, the potential to supercharge our economy. That requires much more coherent government engagement with industry – before officials have worked hard and long to think they have arrived at all the answers.  It also requires underpinning reforms to the conditions that provide the incentives for companies, and  not just those in the traditional defence sector, to invest seriously in AUKUS-related industries. Currently Defence speaks more than it listens, when it should be acting on advice, insights and expertise from industry. Nor can it be left to Defence alone: the needed reforms lie with other portfolios, with a large role for our prime minister as the ‘integrator and encourager in chief’.

Ongoing surprises

With the diffusion of technologies, the weakening of post-World War II norms and institutions, and resurgent revisionist powers, the international environment is less predictable and more dangerous. Conventional, comfortable approaches won’t cut it anymore; we need nation-wide, economy-wide systems that help us manage, if not exploit, shocks from the strategic environment. We need urgency and a national competitiveness mindset.

But the real reason we should expect ongoing surprise is the increasing entanglement of the modalities of conflict. Entanglement—at the conventional, nuclear and cyber levels—promises warfare that is rolling and protean. And that will keep us all on our toes or rocked back on our heels.