What Arab states know – and we don’t

Iran's regime trains & arms terrorist proxies in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and Yemen.

Written by

Michael Shoebridge

There’s an open secret across Middle Eastern governments that is a background driver of their approaches to the war between Israel and Iran and its terrorist proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis: they all welcome a weakened Iran and the dismantling of its dangerous terrorist proxies almost as much as Israel does.

So the Iranian foreign minister’s trip around the region to convince the Saudis and others to join him confronting Israel is doomed to fail.

This is true whatever their views on Israel and Israeli PM Netanyahu. That’s because these terrorist groups that target Israel are also a threat to countries across the region and help grow Iranian power at others’ expense.  Iran and its proxies are destabilising the region. And they’d do so whether there was a war with Israel or not.

Gulf states and regional powers like Turkey and Egypt have watched for the last few decades as Tehran has used political instability in regional neighbours as an opportunity to cultivate and arm violent proxies within destabilised borders.  This is the story of Iran in Iraq and the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ that the Iranian Republican Guard Corps groomed and still supports. 

It’s also the story of Iranian backed pro-Assad militias in Syria who have joined Hezbollah in attacking Israel since 7 October last year.  And it’s true in Yemen where Iran-backed Houthis defeated the Saudi and UAE-supported Yemeni government in a that civil war. Where Iran arms and trains armed groups inside others’ borders, it accelerates institutional weaknesses and feeds chaos, dysfunction and economic stagnation.  Syria and Lebanon showcase this effect. You can extend this chaos-sowing influence to Iran’s supply of missiles and drones to Putin in his war against Ukraine.

So, Turkey welcomes Iranian weakness and Israel’s systematic dismantling of Hezbollah leadership and weapons stockpiles because this lessens Iranian influence on both Syria and Lebanon, which can reduce the flow of Syrian refugees into Turkey.  The Saudis welcome a weakened Iran for the potential leverage it gives over Tehran’s support to the Yemeni Houthis and for the reduced military threat Iran poses to the region. 

Almost every Arab nation is relieved at the reverse that Iran’s decades-long strategic cultivation of armed proxies is receiving at the hands of Israel.  They just won’t say so publicly.  But it’s striking that none of these states has reduced its relations with Israel as the war has unfolded. And the Saudis have even signalled that the normalisation of relations with Israel, deliberately disrupted by Sinwar’s organised atrocities on 7 October last year, can proceed when ceasefires are reached in the war.

While Hamas’s Yahyah Sinwar had hoped that Hezbollah and Iran would join him in his attack on Israel on 7 October last year, he would have had no such hope of the Arab states surrounding Israel. He knows that despite statements of political solidarity with Palestinians, no regional government really wants to carry the burden of the Palestinians more than they already do.  Egypt’s insistence on keeping its border to Gaza shut to fleeing Palestinians is a good measure of things – highlighting the dominance of interests over emotions.

Middle eastern states from Jordan to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have all clamped down on pro-Palestinian protests since the Hamas attack, largely because they see the political unrest these contain as threatening the domestic stability of their own states. The Palestinian issue is seen by them as a ‘gateway to dissent’.

Another measure of regional thinking is the stalled détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia, trumpeted as a diplomatic breakthrough brokered by China in March 2023.  Since the war began, implementation has been stuck on low level items because Iran is refusing to reduce its support to dangerous armed groups in the region – with the Houthis being highest on Riyadh’s list. 

Far from even entertaining this Saudi interest, Iran continues to pretend that it is not the key backer of the Houthis. Tehran is also clearly doubling down on Hezbollah to try to prevent its most powerful terrorist proxy being irreparably damaged by Israel and losing the group’s powerful role within Lebanese politics.  On top of this, any move by Tehran to accelerate its nuclear weapons program will only cement Saudi views that Iran cannot be any kind of partner for regional stability.

Many Israelis are as critical of the Netanyahu government in its actions now and before 7 October last year as any foreign critic.  While they are clear about the existential threat to Israel that Hezbollah, Hamas and Tehran pose, even with the bounce in support for Netanyahu after recent successes against Hezbollah, they too want a new government that can build on Israel’s resurrected military deterrent power once this phase of the war ends. 

But they do not see the sense in governments like France’s calling for an end to military supply of Israel mid-war or Australia’s calling on Israel to unilaterally restrain itself while its enemies seek its destruction. Many Israelis support the current fighting to damage Hezbollah and remove a much larger threat to northern Israel than Hamas ever posed from Gaza.  Like the Saudis though, Israelis live in their region and they understand the strategic problem Iran poses to Israel and to the broader region in a way that seems lost to those on power on Paris and Canberra. 

None of this is new news.  It’s just not news that is widely reported or discussed by many stuck following the bouncing ball of the conflicts with Hamas, Hezbollah and Tehran. Israel is fighting a regional war against Iran and its proxies and its results can include a less dangerous Middle East with more open space for regional nations to craft diplomatic solutions and assist weakened states, once Iran’s toxic reach into them is reduced.  This explains much of the positioning of Arab states and key players like Turkey and the Saudis. 

It’s probably time for policy makers in places like Australia and Europe to not just understand this larger regional picture that is the context for the war, but to also communicate some of it to their populations and use it to shape their policies.  That would make a healthy change from the increasingly empty calls for unilateral ceasefires and tepid condemnation of the terrorism that Iran is now so obviously cultivating and enabling across this intricate and essential region of the world.

This article was first published in The Australian.

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