Donald Trump being willing to negotiate a deal on the war in Ukraine with Vladimir Putin  without Ukraine or European allies should be ringing alarm bells for how President Trump might operate when it comes to our part of the world down here in the Indo Pacific.

Mr Trump is happy to not just deal individually and directly with Mr Putin over the war, he and his senior officials like Secretary of State Marco Rubio are apparently discussing reopening American business connections with Russia, even before Russia ends its war of aggression. Not two months ago, former President Biden was tightening sanctions on Moscow.

It seems that whatever deal Mr Trump comes to with Mr Putin will then be presented to Ukraine and to America’s NATO allies in Europe, including what they are each expected to do. They may have the opportunity to fill in the dots between a broad plan’s boundaries. Ukraine may also have to hand over 100s of $billions in natural resources to reward the for US its help so far.

So far, we have only heard Mr Putin’s terms for ending the war, from the mouths of both Mr Putin and Mr Trump.  Except for wanting a chunk of Ukrainian mineral wealth, there is no sign that Mr Trump is negotiating from a position of difference with Putin, whether that be on no security guarantees for Ukraine from NATO or the US, on legitimising Russia’s seizure of Ukrainian territory, or even on the view of President Zelensky and his government as somehow illegitimate and dictatorial and, most remarkably, as responsible for starting the war (he’s wobbled on this last one since).

The bilateral Trump-Putin discussions are unlikely to be a feasible way to resolve the war, because while American military material has been a key element in helping Ukraine fight Russia, it is Ukrainian courage and creativity and Ukrainian blood and determination that have fought Russia to a stalemate as we approach the war’s fourth year. And European states have much more at stake in any settlement that rewards the Russian aggressor than Mr Trump seems to calculate. 

Ukrainians, notably their President Zelenksy, have their own power to decide whether they keep fighting or sign up to anything that comes out of the Trump-Putin discussions.  And Europe and Ukraine’s other supporters – including Australia – can make our own decisions about continuing or increasing our supply of military equipment to Ukraine.

If Ukraine fails, Mr Trump will bear personal responsibility for empowering Russia and weakening Ukraine.

But what does Mr Trump’s behaviour over Russia and Europe show us about his potential approach to our part of the world? It shows that he is willing – even eager – to have bilateral discussions on core issues of security with America’s adversaries and as happy to exclude America’s partners and allies from these.  That fits with his disdain for multilateral meetings – like NATO ones – during his first term and it also fits with his long tern view that America’s allies have taken advantage of America and constrained American power.

There is a more disturbing layer to the problem: even beginning a discussion about American businesses returning to Russia in these first conversations and meetings, while the war continues signals that business matters much more to Mr Trump than security.  There’s the prospect of America relaxing economic sanctions on Russia and growing business links at the same time as America puts new tariffs on America’s partners and friends.

So, we should be prepared for Donald Trump to meet with the other strongman on the world stage – Xi Jinping – and to think that cutting deals directly with Chairman Xi is the best way to deal with Beijing.  Allies and partners in the region – like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia should be prepared to be treated like the Trump Administration has treated its European partners and allies – hearing news of deals and arrangements reached between Mr Trump and Xi after they have happened, with roles and expectations for us as details to follow later.

Xi Jinping will be ready, because he proposed just this approach as the way the world should work to former US President Obama back in 2013, calling it a New Model for Great Power Relations. Instead of a G-20 or G-7 of world leaders, this would be a G-2. Under that model, China and the US would meet and decide on the world’s problems between themselves.  Obama refused Xi’s kind offer, because he saw America as having a unique advantage over China in the form of America’s alliance network and saw only downsides in cutting allies out to work only with Beijing. It was almost a form of unilateral disarmament.

Mr Trump’s view of allies as free riders constraining America make him likely to take the opposite view.  And right now, China is conducting no active war of aggression against US partners and allies, so security can take a seat even further back in the bus than it seems to be doing in the Trump-Putin calls. Business deals can have the best seats up front. More security-minded folk like Pentagon chief Hesgeth or Secretary of State Rubio can have other views, but as we see with US-Russia talks, they need to follow the President’s lead.

So, anyone cheering as we see those weak Europeans having to step up to the plate on security should take a moment to look in the mirror and think about what happens when the Xi-Trump show comes to our part of the world.  Continuity with the Biden Administration’s close engagement with allies and partners in a collective effort on China seems one of the most unlikely outcomes to expect. Instead, we should prepare for bad news and a bumpy ride.

A version of this article was first published in the Financial Review on 21 February 2025.