So, the US is reviewing the AUKUS sub deal to align it with Donald Trump’s America First approach and to ensure Australia and the UK are stepping up on collective defence.
As America does this review, Australia should take a fresh look too, so we know what we want and why in any negotiations.
What’s the AUKUS balance sheet look like through America First eyes and from an Australian angle?
For America, the sub deal gives the US a new partner who’s willing to fund and operate nuclear submarines, with a multi-billion dollar cash injection into the US submarine industry. And Australia being a major partner of the UK takes a load off the US.
The US Navy gets a base for its subs in Western Australia, and Australian personnel serving on US submarines that helps with crewing challenges. That’s all good news for anyone wearing an America First MAGA cap.
On the downside, though, is the extra strain making submarines for Australia a problem that’s best avoided, given existing US industrial challenges? Despite reforms and extra cash for years, the US has been unable to increase production anywhere near the 2.33 boats a year AUKUS needs.
Then there’s the effect on the US Navy. The early 2030s is when Australia wants its first Virginia Class sub, but this is also a time of peak risk in the US-China military balance and when US submarine numbers are at their lowest. If Australia gets three Virginias, it’ll be 2040 until the US Navy’s fleet recovers. 5 would take until 2049.
Put in blunt MAGA terms, Is weakening America to strengthen Australia worth doing?
And no Australian government will give a binding promise ahead of time to send subs or anything else into a conflict like a war over Taiwan. Instead, we’d decide at the time. That clear bottom line injects a level of uncertainty for the American military and any American president.
Having Australians crewing US submarines probably makes this worse – imagine an Australian government not only not committing its own submarines, but pulling crew out of US Navy submarines.
The AUKUS deal delivers Australia 8 nuclear powered conventionally armed submarines over thirty years. It’s not until the 2040s that Australia has four submarines – and 4 means one is reliably deployable at any time. These weapons spend a lot of time in port and maintenance. One submarine at sea isn’t tipping any military balance.
Whether the expense and diversion of skilled industry and military people to this single project is the best way for Australia to ‘do our part’ on collective defence is a question worth asking. Spending $368 billion on other capabilities and increasing our military power much faster than AUKUS does could well be something America wants. Maybe we should want that too.
On whether we’re ‘stepping up’, can any American looking at our defence program think that we can afford the expensive conventional military we plan along with exorbitantly expensive nuclear submarines for between 2 and 2.3 per cent of our GDP? Probably not.
So, beyond the rhetoric, a bottom line issue for any review is whether Australia is investing enough in its own security to make it a capable collective defence partner. In MAGA America First language, Australia looks like a free rider who wants crown jewels submarines America needs itself.
The Australian balance sheet looks a bit different. Both sides of politics have riveted themselves to AUKUS and told the Australian public how certain they are it’s on track and in great shape. So, it’s more than awkward to have the Trump Administration announce this review with its ‘America First’ focus. Any major change, or cancellation, will be deeply politically embarrassing. Fortunately, politicians have a habit of getting over embarrassment fast.
We’ve also dug ourselves a hole with submarines by changing our minds three times so far– Japanese subs, then French and now AUKUS, so if AUKUS ends or is delayed, we’ll struggle to keep any kind of submarine capability. Extending our Collins submarines life is already happening as far as technically possible. Further extensions look heroic.
We could try to resurrect a Japanese sub deal, but time, motion and credibility are problems.
We could also stop thinking that conventionally armed submarines are the unique magical wonder weapon and consider other long range strike capabilities. It could be in Australian and US interests for us to turn to the B-21 bomber in any renegotiated deal, for example. In stark contrast to taking thirty years to eke out 8 extra submarines, the B-21 production line can make more planes than the US Air Force will buy. So Australia could get a powerful long range strike weapon in the late 2020s or early 2030s in a refocused deal, saving at least $100 billion, with everyone saving face by rebadging, not ending, AUKUS.
Looking in the mirror, our military power is weaker than it should be for the 12th largest economy in the world. And we haven’t thought through what the burden of nuclear submarines is starting to do to the rest of our military. Already, our Army, Air Force and cyber capabilities together are getting less investment than the Navy alone. So, we’re probably undercapitalising everything but the Navy.
Current plans also commit great budget chunks to programs that take decades to deliver small numbers of things. So, in this dangerous next decade, our military power weakens instead of strengthening relative to others. More money soon would help, and help address US concerns, but not if it’s spent on the big, slow projects our bureaucracy loves.
Maybe Australia should also act to reduce our growing dependence on US weapons and technology. However the Review comes out, the fact it exists and may not be the last should show us what other US allies realised a while ago: America remains the most powerful partner we have, but we have to be able to do more for ourselves.
Let’s make the AUKUS Review work for Australia first.
A version of this article was first published in the Financial Review.